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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the stock markets of the developing countries grow and assume a more 
prominent role in the economy, the regulatory framework continues to evolve alongside. 
Functions of a market regulator include enhancing disclosure of information and 
preventing the misuse of asymmetric or insider information, thereby increasing efficiency 
of intermediation by financial markets with respect to savings, price discovery, allocation 
of investment, and the pricing and hedging of risk. Regulatory agencies can add value by 
reducing problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard by enhancing 
transparency and disclosure and by mitigating conflicts of interest. Moreover, regulators 
in the emerging markets are particularly concerned over excessive market volatility since 
it is considered, among other factors, reflecting possible market manipulation and 
speculative trading. In the presence of network effects, where value to any one individual 
increases with the increase in the number of participants, a herding behaviour can ensue 
and lead to excessive volatility and sharp swings in the stock prices.  
A lack of trust in the fairness of markets due to potential for manipulation, 
highlighted by recurring scandals, scams, and irrational exuberance of the investors, 
manifesting itself in speculative bubbles, exacerbate the market volatility. Such 
manipulative and speculative behaviour imposes implicit costs on the market participants 
and increases the cost of intermediation. The inefficiencies in market intermediation 
increase the cost of capital and can be a drag on the economic development. Kanes 
(1988) sees financial instability as a cost of inefficient financial regulation. Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) document the direct cost of poor governance of market intermediaries.  
In this study we examine the regulatory effectiveness in two emerging markets 
in South Asia, India and Pakistan, in dealing with allegations of market manipulation 
and volatility. We study two episodes in India and one in Pakistan during which 
allegations of massive speculation, manipulation and scandals led to political 
pressures on the regulators to phase out a traditional institution common to the two 
countries, that is, of “badla” or Carry-Over-Trade (COT) financing. The next section 
provides institutional background of the two markets. In Section III we describe 
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speculative episodes and the regulatory response in both countries. Section IV 
explains the empirical methodology used to examine the change in the market 
behaviour following regulatory intervention. Section V presents results of our 
empirical research. We note that while Indian regulatory response seems to have 
achieved its objectives in curtailing manipulative and speculative behaviour, there 
seems to be no impact on such behaviour in the case of Karachi Sock Exchange 
(KSE). The final section presents summary and conclusions. 
 
II.  INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE, now known as The Stock Exchange, Mumbai)  is 
the oldest stock exchange in Asia having been established in 1875. Over 4,700 stocks 
with a total market capitalisation of about US $553 billion are traded on the exchange. 
The BSE is among the 5 biggest stock exchanges in the world in terms of transactions 
volume. The BSE was organised as an Association of Persons (AOP) until 2005 when the 
Exchange was de-mutualised and incorporated as an corporate entity. With the 
conversion from a mutual form to the corporate form, the trading rights and ownership 
rights have been de-linked to address concerns regarding perceived and real conflicts of 
interest. 
A major institutional development in India has been the setting up of the National 
Stock Exchange (NSE). The Bombay stock exchange was perceived to be stuck in the 
traditional ways, and as an obstacle in the modernisation of the capital markets. The 
National Stock Exchange of India was promoted by leading financial institutions at the 
behest of the Government of India, and was incorporated in November 1992. Within one 
year of the onset of equity trading at NSE, it became India’s most liquid stock market. 
The launch of derivatives in 2000 by NSE further choked the Bombay Stock Exchange, 
which has lost market share to the NSE every year since then. In equity trading volume 
the BSE share slipped from 45 percent in 2000 to under 32 percent at present. The two 
exchanges represent more than 90 percent share in aggregate turnover of the 23 stock 
exchanges in the country.  
 
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) 
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), established in 1947, is the oldest and the most 
active of the three stock exchanges in Pakistan, and currently lists 662 companies with a 
total market capitalisation of about $52 billion. The KSE100 represents major blue chips 
companies and is fairly good representative of the market. Besides the KSE there are two 
regional stock exchanges in Lahore and Islamabad. The other two exchanges are, 
however, relatively inactive. For example, during July 2005-March 2006 period the 
average daily turnover at the KSE was 462.4 million share, while at LSE and ISE it was 
65.4 and 1.7 million shares, representing 12 percent and 3 percent of the total market 
activity respectively. Despite the small size of the market, KSE experiences a high 
turnover and high price volatility.  
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Exhibit A 
Comparative Market Statistics 
 
Mumbai Stock 
Exchange 
Karachi Stock 
Exchange 
Market Statistic 2001 2005 2001 2005 
No. of Listed Companies 5,795 4,763 747 661 
Market Capitalisation (mil. US $) 110,396 553,074 4,944 45,937 
Trading Value (mil. US $) 249,298 443,175 12,455 140,996 
Turnover Ratio (%) 191.4% 93.6% 226.8% 375.7% 
P/E Ratio* 12.8 19.4 7.5 13.1 
Price to Book Value* 1.9 5.2 0.9 3.5 
Dividend Yield (%)* 2.4% 1.3% 12.5% 2.5% 
% Change in  Index (2005 over 2001)*  260%  410% 
Share of Emerging Market Capitalisation  7.9%  0.7% 
S&P/IFCG Index Correlation  0.69  0.32 
Gross Domestic Product (mil. US $) 478,524 691,163** 71,496 96,115** 
Source:  Global Stock Markets Factbook 2006, Standard and Poor’s. 
Note: *Based on S and P IFC Global Index; ** 2004 figures. 
 
Exhibit A provides salient features of BSE and KSE for comparison. The KSE is 
relatively a much smaller market compared to the BSE, both in terms of the listed 
companies as well as market capitalisation. Reflecting its smaller size the KSE represents 
only 0.7 percent of the total capitalisation of the emerging markets, compared to BSE’s 
7.9 percent share. It is interesting to note the sharp contrast between Pakistan’s 
capitalisation ratio (which is low) and relatively high turnover ratio. This characteristic 
probably reflects noise trading and speculative element in the market. The spectacular 
rise in the KSE (S&P/IFC Index) of 410 percent over the 2001-05 period is remarkable, 
though 260 percent appreciation of the BSE also stands in sharp contrast with the 
performance elsewhere in the world. The appreciation in the KSE100 index and BSE30 
index was 534 percent and 137 percent respectively for the same period. The Pakistani 
stock market appreciation was four times higher than the Indian market despite a higher 
rate of growth in the Indian GDP for the same period. Exhibit A also shows that the PE 
ratio and Price to Book value of Pakistani companies included in the S&P/IFC Global 
Index is nearly 2/3, and the dividend yield nearly half of that of the Indian companies. 
Another important difference is the higher degree of correlation of the BSE (0.69) with 
the S&P Composite Index, compared with correlation coefficient of 0.32 in case of KSE, 
which reflects a higher degree of integration of the BSE with the international capital 
markets. 
Besides, the differences between the two markets in size, activity and other 
characteristics noted above, there are two aspects of these markets which may have a 
direct bearing on the regulatory response and its effectiveness in dealing with market 
manipulation and volatility. First, there is difference in the industry structure and 
competition among the stock exchanges. As already noted above, in case of India, NSE 
has emerged as the leading stock exchange in the country, with 45 percent market share, 
thus eliminating BSE’s monopolistic position that it had enjoyed ever since its inception. 
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NSE along with 22 other active regional exchanges creates a more competitive 
environment.  In Pakistan, KSE is the dominant player with 85 percent share of the 
trading activity. 
Second, there seems to be a significant difference between the regulatory 
enforcement and effectiveness of public policy. Nageswaran and Krithivasan (2006), for 
example, claim that only Singapore, Hong Kong and India are effective in enforcement 
among Asian countries. According to data compiled by Goyal (2004), SEBI had taken up 
657 cases for investigation in the period 1992-2003, and had completed 424 cases. 250 
prosecutions were launched against collective investment schemes over 2001-03. During 
the same year there were 257 actions taken against brokers and others out of which there 
were 42 suspensions. SEBI’s record in redressing grievances also appears to be effective; 
the redress rate is about 95 percent. In contrast, according to a survey conducted by La 
Porta, et al. (2006) Pakistan scores rather low on the indices of (i) orders to issuers, 
distributors and accountants (ii) criminal sanctions and (iii) public enforcement which 
capture the extent to which a public regulator exercises investigative power and its ability 
to impose penalties. Pakistan’s score on these three indices is 0.17, 0.08 and 0.58, 
compared to India’s 0.67, 0.83 and 0.67 respectively. Khwaja and Mian (2005) remark 
with respect to Pakistan that, “Thus, it is not surprising that to date there has hardly been 
any case in which a broker was prosecuted for improper activity.” 
 
The Badla or Traditional Carry Forward System 
An old and traditional informal institution common to both India and Pakistan is 
that of Badla, meaning something in return. It is a local term for a forward trading 
facility, and essentially is a repo transaction carried out in a separate after-hours market 
where the borrower who takes the badla from a badla broker, carries forward his security 
exposure from the current settlement period to the next one, by sale of his position in the 
present period and its repurchase in the subsequent settlement period at a predetermined 
price differential. In the event of a purchase, the investor may want to carry forward the 
transaction to the next settlement cycle and for doing so, he has to compensate the seller 
who sold it with an intention of receiving cash.  
 
III. MARKET CRISIS AND REGULATORY RESPONSE 
 
The Indian Experience 
In June 1991, the new Indian government accelerated the process of economic 
liberalisation, privatisation and opening up of the economy, setting off expectations 
of an unprecedented growth and prosperity for the economy. The stock market 
started booming—the BSE30 rose from around 1000 in February 1991 to a peak of 
4500 in March 1992. There was an enormous increase in the demand for margin 
finance by the investors, while, there were heavy margins imposed by the BSE. It led 
the market participants to find innovative solutions, sometimes not legal, to meet 
their financing requirements. 
The new free market environment put immense pressure on the public sector, in 
particular on the nationalised banks, to improve financial performance and capital 
adequacy. Banks, holding large cash balances not subject to reserve requirements under 
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the Portfolio Management Scheme and cash raised by the public sector units through 
foreign exchange borrowing, became eager to explore new venues of higher returns. The 
market did not take long to innovative ways of avoiding regulation and diverting funds 
from the banking system (from the inter-bank market for government securities) to the 
stock market. It was done mainly through the ready forward deal mechanism, a variant of 
repo or repurchase agreement, and the badla system often using fraudulent and non-
existing securities. The resulting “securities scam,” personified by Hashad Metha, led to a 
diversion of funds to the tune of over $ 1.2 billion from the banking system to the stock 
market during the period April 1991 to May 1992. For a detailed reconstruction of the 
scam and regulatory response see Barua and Varma (1993). 
With the discovery of the scam, the stock prices dropped by over 40 percent in less 
than two months, wiping out market value by about $35 billion. The government 
responded by promulgating an ordinance with several harsh provisions, including 
attachment of the properties of the accused in the scam. It set up a special court to try 
those accused in the scam. It also voided all transactions in “tainted shares” that had been 
routed through involved brokers and their firms, which also caused market disruption. 
Another unintended consequence was to slow down the reform process which busted the 
speculative boom of early 1990s. 
The badla system was blamed for causing “excessive speculations” in the market 
and for the irregularities in the stock exchanges in the form of non-enforcement of 
margins, non-reporting of transactions and illegal trading outside the stock exchange. 
Consequently, in March 1994 the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 
effectively banned the facility, but, yielding to the demands from the brokerage 
community, introduced a modified badla system subject to certain safeguards effective 
January 1996. In 1997 further safeguards were put in place, such as segregation of carry 
forward transactions at the time of execution of trade, daily margin of 10 percent, one-
half of which would be collected upfront, and overall carry forward limits per broker. 
In the late 1990s the dotcom boom in information, communications, and 
entertainment stocks all over the world contributed to the bull run on the BSE, which 
almost doubled in a short period from January 1999 to February 2000. The speculative 
spell led to overextended positions, and afforded many opportunities for fraud and 
manipulation, personified by the Bombay Bull, Ketan Parekh, considered to be the main 
villain. He had managed to manipulate ill-liquid stocks, known as the ‘K-10’ stocks, by 
borrowing from various companies and banks using the shares as collateral. It worked 
well in the bull market, but busted when the markets started crashing in March 2000, led 
by a fall in the NASDAQ. In the next two months, while the NASDAQ declined by 35.9 
percent, Sensex lost 23 percent and the K-10 stocks crashed by 67 percent [see ICFAI 
(2002)]. 
Following the crash in the stock markets SEBI launched immediate investigations 
into the volatility of stock markets. SEBI also decided to inspect the books of several 
brokers who were suspected of triggering the crash. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
ordered investigation into the capital market exposure of some banks, following media 
reports that some banks may have exceeded prudential norms of capital exposure, thereby 
contributing to the stock market volatility. The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) President 
was forced to resign following allegations that he had used some privileged information, 
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which contributed to the crash. In the aftermath, at least eight people were reported to 
have committed suicide while hundreds of investors were driven to the brink of 
bankruptcy. The scam brought into question banks’ funding of capital market operations 
and lending funds against security collateral. It also shattered investors’ confidence in the 
functioning of the stock markets. SEBI launched a cycle of regulation to control the 
damage including increasing margin requirements, imposing restriction on short sales, 
and requiring stock deliveries following sale. It suspended all of the broker member 
directors of BSE’s board and banned trading by exchange officers. The badla system was 
banned, effective from July 2001, and a rolling settlement system was introduced. 
 
The Pakistan Experience 
The KSE experienced a steady bull run as reflected in both the KSE 100 index and 
trading volumes, starting just after the last stock market crisis in May 2002, which 
accelerated towards the end of 2004. The KSE 100 saw an unprecedented rise of 65 
percent, from 6,218 on December 31, 2004 to 10,303 on March 15, 2005, along with an 
increase in the value traded from around $300-400 million to $1-2 billion per day. The 
market turned negative in the second half of March, 2005 and index dropped to as low as 
6,939 on April 12, 2005, a decline of 32.7 percent from its peak. The sharp rise in the 
index could not be explained by any change in the fundamentals. The following 
precipitous fall is also somewhat of a puzzle. Such a meteoric rise in index and a 
subsequent crash is indicative of a classical speculative bubble in the equity market.  
Badla has been blamed as one of the reasons for the March 2005 crisis. Pakistan’s 
influential financial newspaper Business Recorder stated that there were two problems. 
First, badla financing was only open to a small number of market players, which also 
includes financial institutions, as opposed to share trading. Second, badla financing was 
provided by short-term investors and the hot money can disappear overnight. During 
2004-05, KSE investors were willing to borrow at exorbitant badla rates (which were 
capped at 18 percent in KSE but rose in the uncapped Lahore Stock Exchange to over 
100 percent) because the accelerated rise in stock prices made even expensive borrowing 
feasible. The COT (badla) financing ranged from 33 percent to 45 percent of investment 
at KSE throughout 2004. The higher demand for badla investment pushed the average 
badla rates from 9.4  percent in 2003,  to 11.4 percent in 2004, ranging from 12 to 19 
percent, even though market interest rates remained stable at a relatively low level 
through most of 2004.  
After the March 2005 crisis, a task force was set up by the Chairman of Securities 
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) to identify the causes for the situation 
arising at the country’s three stock exchanges in March 2005 and to propose measures for 
strengthening and consolidating the regulatory regime, particularly with a view to 
enabling emergency intervention, preventing systematic risk and promoting market 
stability. The task force completed its report in July 2005 identifying a few areas that 
contributed to the instability in the stock prices. The Task Force recommended that there 
was a need for structural reforms and steps were needed to protect public interest by 
ensuring that the financial might that has been accumulated by the stock brokerage and 
badla financing institutions should be effectively checked and brought to a reasonable 
size to ensure that they are unable to manipulate the market.  
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Besides badla financing, other factors which contributed to this bull-run included, 
increased liquidity due to higher foreign remittances, a regime of low interest rates, IPO’s 
of public sector enterprises marked for divestment and floatation of more mutual funds. 
During this period, especially since mid October, 2004, there was an unusual build-up in 
the media about the prospects of a rise in the KSE index. Statements from government 
officials linked the rise in the KSE index to good economic management, indicated that 
the market was destined to rise further, and announcement of the impending accelerated 
program for the privatisation of prominent and profitable public sector corporations 
fuelled the bullish sentiment. Conduct of corporate officials contributed to the market 
speculation; for example, rumors of new oil and gas discoveries which would raise stock 
value manifold went un-refuted or clarified by the management. There were also 
allegations of “wash trades” and “pump and dump” plays by brokers. 
The main thrust of the Pakistani regulators was to replace badla with formal 
financing arrangements. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) in collaboration with SECP 
came out with rules governing margin financing issued to stock brokers by banks. The 
SBP rules specified the conditions of extending such loans to stock market brokers with 
proper risk management and internal controls. It also specified the minimum margin 
requirement of 30 percent and reminded banks of the per party limit, in case of such 
lending to brokers. The SECP had intended to completely eliminate the carryover market 
(the badla market) by the end of December 2004, but slow progress by the regulators 
delayed implementation. 
Regarding the replacement of badla financing the regulatory body was seen as 
vacillating. For example, we quote a newspaper op-ed, Badla is back. “But firmness 
doesn’t appear to be the strong point of the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan. … What went wrong? Or, rather, how heavy was the pressure from vested 
interests? Were the members of the Karachi Stock Exchange so powerful that they 
managed to force the regulator to work in their interest? The SECP has not only proved to 
be a weak regulator but also exposed itself to the criticism that it acts first and thinks 
later” [The News (2005)]. 
There were other factors which lessened the effectiveness of the regulators’ 
actions. First, the composition of the Task Force was not without conflicts of interest as 
its members also were on the Policy Board investigating matters which should have been 
the subject matter of the Board itself when formulating capital markets policies. Second, 
the mostly held view is that the March debacle was due to excessive institutional selling 
and the withdrawal of badla financing simultaneously from the market. In the past, SECP 
had been criticised for allowing the brokerage houses to own commercial and investment 
banks which provided them additional resources to enter into badla financing and use it 
to manipulate market. Third, the Task Force, a creation of SECP itself, could not look 
into the question of inadequate surveillance and weak implementation by SECP.  
The Task Force also did not look into the role of KSE management, in possibly 
precipitating the withdrawal of the badla facility by calling upon the various brokers and 
institutions to reconfirm that they would be able to honor their obligations in the future 
contracts, and sending alarming signals to market players. As there were four SECP 
nominated directors on the KSE board, there is a possibility of conflict of interest. 
However, while the KSE does receive some oversight from the SECP, it is predominantly 
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broker-managed, i.e., majority of the exchange’s board of directors including the 
chairman are brokers. The Task force also did not investigate the allegation of market 
manipulation by certain mutual funds through withdrawing the badla financing and to 
take advantage of the pursuing crash. 
 
IV.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY 
In order to empirically analyse the impact of the regulatory intervention, primarily 
abolishing of badla system, following market scams and episodes of speculative 
behaviour, we study the return volatility in the two stock exchanges before and after the 
events. It is strongly argued in the finance literature [e.g., De Long, Shleifer, et al. 
(1990)] that noise traders cause excessive trading and volatility. Speculative trading in 
derivative securities has also been blamed for causing excessive volatility (Jegadeesh and 
Subrahmanyam, 1993). Some economists have even argued for imposing tax on short-
term trades to contain volatility [e.g., Stiglitz (1989)].  
Among the related research, in the context of India, Bhattacharya, et al. (2003) 
examine the stability of the day-of-the-week effect in returns and volatility during 
1991–2000 and do not find the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable for badla 
financing to be significant. Goswami and Angshuman (2000) also report that badla 
trading had no impact on the day-of the-week pattern of returns. Eleswarapu and 
Krishnamurti (1995) study whether badla financing facility had led to speculative 
volatility on the Bombay Stock Exchange prior to March 1994. They do not “find any 
evidence that supports the allegations made by regulators that badla trading 
destabilises the stock prices and causes excessive volatility.” The impact of 
abolishing of badla system in Pakistan has not been studied so far to our knowledge. 
However, Ahmed, Rosser and Uppal (1996) document the existence of bubbles over 
the period 1987-1994. Mangla and Uppal (1996) report market inefficiencies. The 
existence of price manipulative behaviour on the KSE is rigorously documented by 
Khawja and Mian (2005).  
We conduct empirical analysis of the impact of regulatory intervention in the two 
markets in order to subdue speculative behaviour with reference to stock price volatility. 
First, we examine the variance of the stock returns and conduct F-test for variance 
equality. Second, we modify the variance tests to exclude possible influence of the 
international stock markets and conditional auto-regressive heteroskedasticity on the 
variance process. Variance of the residuals from the GARCH-M model in the before- and 
after- sub-periods are tested for equality by employing the usual F-test. Third, we include 
a dummy variable in the GARCH variance equation to capture the impact of the 
regulatory response on the market volatility. The GARCH methodology is further explain 
below. 
Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity was proposed by Engle (1982) to 
explain the tendency of large residuals to cluster together. A general form of an 
ARCH/GARCH model is: 
yt = Xtβ + ut ,and the variance of ut, ht follows the process: 
ht = h(ut–1 , ut–2 ,  ... ut–q, ht–1 , ht–2  ... ,ht–p , Xt–1, Xt–2, ..., Xt–k, α)  
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Where α  is a set of unknown parameter. In the Bollerslav (1986) model, the variance 
term depends upon the lagged variances, as well as the lagged squared residuals, to model 
persistence in volatility. The variance model for the standard GARCH (p, q) model is: 
ht = c0 + a1u2t–1 +  a2u2t–2 + ... + aqu2t–q + b1ht–1 +  a2ht–2 + ... + bpht–p  
We employ GARCH(1,1) to account for the persistence in volatility in the returns 
series. The GARCH-M model employed here is as follows: 
Rt = Xtβ + ut where ut ~ N(0, ht) … … … … … (1) 
ht = c0 + a1u2t–1 + b1ht–1  … … … … … … (2) 
In our model Xt consists of, besides the constant term, a vector of ‘returns’ on the 
MSCI World Index measured as RIt = ln(It) - ln(It-1), and the conditional variance (ht) as 
explanatory variables. Variance of the residuals from the GARCH-M model in the before- and 
after- regulatory change are then tested for equality employing the usual F-test.  
The impact on return volatility following regulatory response is also examined by 
including a dummy variable Dt in the variance Equations (2) which takes a value of one 
for period after the change in the regulations and zero otherwise. The variance equation 
with the regulatory dummy is now as follows: 
ht = c0 + a1u2t–1 + b1ht–1 + dDt  … … … … … (2a) 
The coefficient on the dummy variable should capture the impact of regulatory 
intervention on the volatility of the market returns. 
 
Data and Sample Period 
Data for this study was taken from the Datastream International, Ltd. Database for 
the Karachi Stock Exchange 100 Index (KSE100) and for Bombay Stock Exchange index 
of 30 major companies (BSE30 SENSITIVE). Daily closing values of the indices were 
used for the period from 1/1/1993 to 12/29/1995, and from 1/1/2000 to 3/31/2003 for the 
BSE to cover the two periods during the period of change. The corresponding event 
window is form 1/1/2004 to 8/30/2006 for the KSE. We study the market behaviour by 
dividing each event window into, before and after sub-periods. For the BSE, we leave out 
a three month intervals between the sub-periods to allow the market to adjust to the new 
regulatory environment. For the KSE, we exclude five months since the issue remained 
under consideration for longer period and the change was not implemented immediately. 
All price data was converted to “returns” by taking the natural log differences of the 
index level Pt thus: Rt = ln(Pt) – ln(Pt–1). 
 
V.  RESULTS 
Summary statistical results for the first four moments for the return series are 
shown in Table 1. We note that the return distributions in both countries exhibit 
significant departure from the normal distribution, Skewness and Kurtosis are very 
significant, and the Jarque-Bera statistic for both markets and for all periods strongly 
rejects normality hypothesis. Results for tests for difference in the mean for the two sub-
period  samples  are  presented in  Table 2.   For  the 1994 instance of abolishing badla in  
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Table 1 
Summary Market Statistics 
Bombay Stock Exchange 
 1993-1995 
Bombay Stock Exchange 
2000-03 
Karachi Stock Exchange 
2004-06 
Daily Index 
Return  
(Percent)  
Jan 93 
to 
Dec 95 
Jan 93 
to 
Feb 94 
Jun 94 
to 
Dec 95 
Jan 00 
to 
Mar 03 
Jan 00 
to 
Jun 01 
Oct 01 
to 
Mar 03 
Jan 04 
To 
Aug 06 
Jan 04 
to 
Feb 05 
Aug 05 
to 
Aug 06 
Mean 0.0222 0.1636 –0.0503 –0.0586 –0.0949 0.0207 0.1170 0.2025 0.1202 
Variance 0.0206 0.0327 0.0126 0.0271 0.0420 0.0118 0.0248 0.0098 0.0280 
Skewness –0.1077 –0.2828 0.1524 –0.3388 –0.2583 0.2787 –0.4937 –0.5222 –0.5962 
Kurtosis 2.9242 2.1863 0.8294 2.6123 1.1944 1.2321 1.7263 2.4753 1.3910 
Minimum –0.0899 –0.0899 –0.0385 –0.0742 –0.0742 –0.0395 0.1186 –0.0356 0.1064 
Maximum 0.0563 0.0563 0.0418 0.0712 0.0712 0.0445 –0.0606 0.0342 –0.0606 
Jarque-Bera  279.77 64.17 13.449 256.73 27.52 29.81 114.53 91.12 39.58 
Observations 781 302 413 846 390 391 695 303 283 
 
Table 2 
Test for Mean Inequality 
T-Test for Mean Difference: 
Assuming Unequal Variances 
Daily Index Return  
    (Percent) 
BSE30   
1993-95 
BSE30   
2000-2003 
KSE100  
2004-06 
Mean Ist Sub-period 0.1636 –0.0949 0.2025 
Mean 2nd Sub-period –0.0503 0.0207 0.1202 
t-stat 1.8172 –0.9848 0.7191 
P(T<=t) One-tail 0.0349 0.1626 0.2362 
 
India, the mean daily return for the BSE in the first sub-period is 0.1636 percent, while it 
is –0.0503 percent in the second sub-period. The t-test for mean difference is significant 
at 5 percent level; one-tail probability (T ≤ t) is 3.5 percent. On the other hand, for the 
second event of banning badla system in 2001, the mean difference is not significant at 
conventional levels; the achieved significance level is 16.2 percent. In Table 2, the t-test 
for mean difference in the daily return on the KSE in the two sub-periods is not 
significant; one-tail probability (T ≤ t) is 23.6 percent. Though the mean difference is not 
significant, it is interesting to note that the sample mean daily returns in second sub-
period, though lower than in the first sub-period, remains high relative to historic 
experience and to the other emerging markets. It seems that the KSE bullish sentiment 
continued to rule, contrary to the intentions of the regulators.  
Table 3 (panel A) presents the test results for difference in the variance over the 
studied events in the two markets. For the BSE, the F-test for unequal variance strongly 
rejects the null hypothesis both for the 1994 and 2001 episodes. For the 1994-95 study 
period the variance of daily returns in the second sub-period was significantly lower than 
in the first; 0.0126 percent compared with 0.0327 percent. Similarly, for the 2000-03 
study period, the variance in the later sub-period (0.0128 percent) is significantly lower 
than in the first sub-period (0.0420 percent). The behaviour of the KSE, however, appears 
to be quite the opposite. The sample variance is actually higher in the second period than 
in the first, 0.0280 percent vs. 0.0098 percent, or approximately 2.8 times the first sub-
period variance. The F-test for unequal variance strongly rejects the null. 
Market Volatility and Regulatory Response 1081
Table 3 
Test for Variance Difference 
F-test for Unequal 
Variances  
PANEL A: Unadjusted  
Returns Series 
PANEL B: Using Residuals from the 
GARCH-M Model 
Daily Index Return  
(Percent) 
BSE30  
1993-95 
BSE30  
2000-2003 
KSE100 
2004-06 
BSE30  
1993-95 
BSE30  
2000-2003 
KSE100 
2004-06 
Variance Ist Sub-period 0.0327 0.0420 0.0098 0.0333 0.0393 0.0098 
Variance 2nd Sub-period 0.0126 0.0118 0.0280 0.0123 0.0115 0.0280 
F-stat 2.6024 3.5499 2.8469 2.6998 3.4099 2.8476 
P(F<=f) One-tail 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
In order to study the response of the two markets with respect to the regulatory 
changes with more robust controls, we account for the possibility of international stock 
markets and conditional auto-regressive heteroskedasticity influencing the variance 
process. It was accomplished by including the MSCI World index in a GARCH-M model 
and then conducting an equality of variance F-test on the residuals. The results of the test 
of variance equality are presented in panel B of Table 3. The results confirm the 
conclusion from the test on unadjusted variances reported in panel A, i.e., for the Indian 
experience the volatility subsided following regulatory measures, while it was 
exacerbated in the case of KSE. The shift in the variance is in the opposite direction for 
the two markets and is statistically significant in all cases. 
Table 4 reports results from estimation of the GARCH-M model with dummy 
variable representing the regulatory change. The dummy variable for the Indian market 
has a negative coefficient which is statistically significant at 5 percent significance level. 
It indicates that the variance of the return process dropped significantly after the 
regulatory intervention. On the other hand in the case of the Karachi Stock Exchange the 
dummy variable is not statistically significant, although it is of positive sign. Thus the 
robust tests for the shift in volatility tend to support the conclusions of the simple test of 
variance equality. In addition, all GARCH variables C, A and B, corresponding to the 
GARCH Equation (2) are statistically significant. In addition, the coefficient for MSCI 
World Index is statistically significant for the Indian market, while not significant for the 
Pakistani market. It seems to point out to the greater integration of the Indian stock 
market with the financial markets of the rest of the world. 
 
Table 4 
Results of Garch Model Estimation 
 BSE30: 1993-1995 BSE30: 2000-2003 KSE100: 2004-2006 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Constant –0.00101 –1.16 0.00033 0.44 0.00227 4.21** 
RETMSCI 0.20251 1.94* 0.13811 3.71** 0.05749 0.83 
GARCH-V 5.72384 1.23 –0.80969 –0.23 –0.76371 –0.26 
C 0.00003 2.15** 0.00003 2.70** 0.00001 3.43** 
A 0.10631 3.16** 0.14492 4.06** 0.24551 5.67** 
B 0.79988 12.43** 0.75884 13.18** 0.72977 19.70** 
DUMMY –0.00002 –2.00** –0.00002 –2.35** 0.00000 0.84 
Observations 781   846  695 
Note: * and ** indicate statistical significance level of 10 percent and 5 percent respectively. 
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VI.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have analysed episodes of market manipulation and volatility and 
the ensuing regulatory intervention in two emerging South Asian markets, India and 
Pakistan. Our empirical analysis indicates that while the Indian regulatory agencies seem 
to have achieved their objectives in curtailing manipulative and speculative behaviour, 
there seems to be little impact on such behaviour in the case of KSE. The bullish 
sentiment and volatility on the KSE continued unabated despite the measures taken by 
the SECP apparently to curtail speculative trading allegedly fanned by the badla system. 
On the other hand the regulator of the BSE appears to have succeeded in their goals of 
cooling off the market in both 1994-95 and 2000-03 periods.  
Though there are commonalities in terms of civil code, and cultural and business 
environments in the two countries, we note significant differences in the regulatory 
effectiveness and industry structure that may explain the difference in the market 
behaviour outcomes following regulatory interventions. It is important to note that the 
response of the Indian regulators in dealing with the market manipulations and 
speculative behaviour appears to be much stronger and effective than was the case in 
Pakistan. The Indians regulatory response was three pronged: (1) discovering and 
punishing the guilty, (2) recovering the money, and (3) reforming the system. The 
Pakistani regulators on the other hand only pursued institutional restructuring mainly 
focusing on replacement of the badla system. No criminal or civil charges were filed, and 
no recovery was sought. This response may have been perceived by the market as weak, 
and may not have conveyed a strong signal to the market regarding government’s resolve 
for effective enforcement. It is possible that extra-market manipulations by speculators, 
such as documented by Khwaja and Mian (2005), may have frustrated the efforts of the 
KSE regulators. Another possibility is that the badla system may not have been a cause 
of the alleged speculative fever, as was the case for BSE reported by researchers and 
mentioned earlier. 
Another significant factor is that, in India, the National Stock Exchange is a 
viable competitor to the BSE. The competitive environment in the market for the 
service of organised exchanges creates stronger pressures on the regulatees to self-
regulate, reform, modernisation and comply with the public policy. It strengthens the 
hands of the regulators in dealing with the recalcitrant and vested “clubby” 
organisational cultural which allegedly surrounds both stock exchanges. In, case of 
KSE, however, it’s near monopoly position may have been a factor in frustrating the 
goals of the regulators. 
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